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INTRODUCTION

The last thirty years have witnessed an explosion in governmental
activity. Not surprisingly, one of the results has been an enormous in-

crease in the number of lawsuits brought by or against the government.'
*
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1. An item of federal legislation that has sparked a significant increase in litigation involving
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In such litigation the individual plaintiff or defendant often alleges that
the government is precluded from asserting a particular claim or defense
because of estoppel.
This article focuses on whether federal or state governments should
be subject to being estopped from collecting mineral royalties from mineral lessees. Part II explains the nature of equitable doctrine of estoppel.
Part III illustrates the principal approaches to governmental estoppel in

general. Each federal appellate circuit has interpreted the Supreme
Court's pronouncements in different ways at different times. Addition-

ally, each of the states has the latitude to fashion its own rules concerning
the estoppel of state government institutions. State courts have often

looked to conservative federal authorities. Part IV analyzes the approaches of jurisdictions where governmental royalty collection has been

litigated or made the subject of legislation. Courts and legislatures tend
to reject governmental estoppel in the area of mineral royalty. To protect the public fisc and prevent corruption, governmental estoppel is currently and should remain a blind alley for oil and gas producers and
operators.
II. ESTOPPEL IN A NUTSHELL
The doctrine of estoppel is an instrument of equity which is invoked
by parties and applied by courts for the express purpose of accomplishing
justice.2 Although courts have expressed a variety of formulations of the
doctrine, the United States Supreme Court has recently described estoppel as follows:
[T]he party claiming the estoppel must have relied on its adversary's

conduct 'in such a manner as to change his position for the worse,' and
that reliance must have been reasonable in that the party claiming the
estoppel did not know nor should it have known that its adversary's
the government is the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 USC §§ 1346(b), 2671-80 (1989 & Supp. 1990).
See OPM v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 431 (1990).
2. Heckler v. Community Health Services, 467 U.S. 51, 59 (1984) (stating that estoppel is an
equitable doctrine invoked to avoid injustice in particular cases). The essential elements of equitable
estoppel are that the offender has made a false representation or concealment of facts; he must have
known or should have known the facts and he must have intended for the offended party to act on
the information; the offended party must have been unaware of the true facts and must have relied
on the misinformation to his disadvantage. 31 C.J.S. Estoppel § 67 (1988). It is useful to elicit other
definitions of estoppel given in Corpus Juris Secundum:
Equitable estoppel is defined in many cases as the effect of the voluntary conduct of a party
whereby he is absolutely precluded, both at law and in equity, from asserting rights which
might perhaps have otherwise existed, either of property, or of contract, or of remedy, as
against another person who in good faith relied on such conduct, and has been led thereby
to change his position for the worse, and who on his part acquires some corresponding
right either of contract or of remedy ....
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conduct was misleading.3
Thus, in order to protect an honest party, a court of equity will estop a
malefactor from asserting an otherwise enforceable right.4
III.

THREE APPROACHES TO GOVERNMENTAL
ESTOPPEL IN GENERAL

It is widely accepted that government estoppel raises considerations
which are not present when a private party is sought to be estopped from
enforcing his legal rights. Clearly, estoppel of the government involves
or may involve issues such as the sovereignty of the state, public finance,
and possible corruption of governmental officials.
American courts and legislatures have taken three basic approaches
to governmental estoppel. A conservative view states that the federal
government may never be subject to estoppel, or, if it is, only in truly
exceptional circumstances. A more liberal view, favored by the Ninth
Circuit, holds that the government may be estopped in cases of "affirmative misconduct," or other injustice. Louisiana, interestingly, has no
concept of governmental estoppel, as distinct from ordinary, private estoppel. However, Louisiana does possess "mandatory" or "prohibitory"
laws, where no one may raise the defense of estoppel. This effectively
means that the Louisiana government may not be estopped to enforce
any law of public significance.
It should be emphasized that the following brief review of the three
approaches is illustrative only. Governmental estoppel as a general topic
is a vast field, in which particular areas of governmental activity, such as
tax, social security, immigration, and criminal enforcement, raise different sub-issues and nuances. Additionally, the United States Supreme
Court has not always been entirely consistent on government estoppel, as
evidenced by the occasional ambiguous language of the Court. Consequently, this has encouraged the federal appellate circuits to adopt their
own interpretations of the law. However, some brief explanation of the
main approaches to governmental estoppel is necessary to understand the
issue of governmental estoppel in the context of mineral royalty
collection.
3. Heckler, 467 U.S. at 59 (footnote omitted) (quoting 3 J. POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRU-

DENCE § 805 (S. Symans ed., 1941)).
4. Different from estoppel, contemporaneous construction can be pled when a contract is
vague, and is used to determine whether a legal right ever existed. Estoppel, and the other equitable
defenses such as waiver, ratification, acquiescence, and laches, on the other hand, are used to defeat
an otherwise enforceable legal right.
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A.

The Conservative Approach

The conservative view, as expressed by several United States
Supreme Court decisions, is that the federal government may never be
subject to estoppel. However, if estoppel of the federal government could
exist as a viable defense, it could only be pled in truly unusual
circumstances.
A leading case on federal governmental estoppel is Federal Crop Insurance Corporation v. Merrill.' Federal Crop involved government insurance of a wheat crop. A government agent erroneously advised a
farmer that his crop was insurable. But certain regulations precluded the
particular crop from qualifying for insurance.6 Consequently, the crop
was lost and the government refused to pay. Subsequently, the farmer
brought suit, trial proceeded, and the jury returned a verdict in favor of
the plaintiff. The Supreme Court of Idaho affirmed on the theory that,
had the agent been acting for a private insurance company, the company
would have been liable. But the United States Supreme Court reversed,
rejecting the availability of estoppel against the government:
If the Federal Crop Insurance Act has by explicit language prohibited
the insurance of spring wheat which is reseeded on winter wheat acreage, the ignorance of such a restriction, either by the respondents or by
the Corporation's agent would be immaterial and recovery could not
7
be had against the Corporation ....
The Federal Crop decision could be interpreted as prohibiting governmental estoppel in all instances. The Court focused on the fact that
the government must be allowed to enforce the law untrammelled by the
erroneous or fraudulent statements of its agents: "[a]nyone entering into
an arrangement with the government takes the risk of having accurately
ascertained that he who purports to act for the government stays within
the bounds of his authority." 8
Subsequent to FederalCrop, the Supreme Court adopted a softer but
still hostile view of governmental estoppel. Dicta in some later cases
have suggested, contrary to the holding in FederalCrop, that there might
be situations in which a government agent's actions could give rise to an
estoppel. However, the Court has reversed every lower court finding of
estoppel it has reviewed.9
5. 332 U.S. 380 (1947).

6. Id at 385.
7. Id. at 384.
8. Id.
9. OPM v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 427, 430 (1990); see, e.g., INS v. Miranda, 459 U.S. 14
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The issue of governmental estoppel was again raised in Heckler v
Community Health Services.10 In Heckler a government agent, Travelers

Insurance Company, had wrongly advised Community Health Services
(CHS) that it could receive a dual reimbursement under two government

programs for the cost of training and compensating economically disadvantaged employers.'I CHS relied on the erroneous oral advice, substantially expanded its operations, and claimed twice for its costs. Travelers
subsequently attempted to reclaim the unauthorized portion. The Third
Circuit Court of Appeals found that Travelers' erroneous advice constituted "affirmative misconduct" and ruled the government's agent

estopped. 12
The Supreme Court reversed, finding that the facts could not even
support an ordinary private estoppel. 3 In fact, the Heckler Court held

that it is tenable that the government may never be subject to estoppel.
Further, even if the government may be estopped, it could not be on the
same terms as any other individual. 4 Still further, governmental estoppel can never be applied relating to public funds, 5 even if it were possible
in other circumstances. Finally, the court declared that governmental
6
estoppel cannot be invoked on the basis of oral representations.'
Most recently, the Supreme Court has reiterated the conservative
principles of Heckler. The issue in Office of Personnel Management v
Richmond was whether oral and written advice given by a government
employee to a benefits claimant may give rise to an estoppel against the
(1982); Schweiker v. Hansen, 450 U.S. 785 (1981); INS v. Hibi, 414 U.S. 5 (1973); Montana v.
Kennedy, 366 U.S. 303 (1961).
10. 467 U.S. 51 (1984).
11. Travelers incorrectly advised CHS that CETA funds were seed money to be reimbursed
under medicare even though the same costs were already funded by other government programs. Id.
at 55-56.
12. Community Health Services v. Califano, 698 F.2d 615, 620 (3d. Cir 1983).
13. The Court found that the element of reasonable reliance was lacking for three reasons: The
government cannot be expected to ensure that every tiny bit of informal advice given by its agents is
sufficiently reliable to justify the expenditure of substantial sums of money; CHS knew that Travelers
was acting as an intermediary and consequently not authorized to resolve a policy question; and,
Travelers' advice was oral. Heckler, 467 U.S. at 65.
14. Heckler echoed earlier Supreme Court authorities in setting forth the strong policy arguments against governmental estoppel, but reserved the issue whether the government can ever by
estopped. Id. at 60-61; see Payne v. Block, 751 F.2d 1191, 1192 (11th Cir. 1985) (distinguishing
Heckler).
15. "Protection of the public fisc requires that those who seek public funds act with scrupulous
regard for the requirements of law." Heckler, 467 U.S. at 63. An even more direct statement was
made in 1990 when the Supreme Court said that "estoppel cannot be entertained [against the governmentJ where public money is at stake. ... Extended to its logical conclusion, operation of estoppel against the government in the context of payment of funds from the Treasury could in fact
render the Appropriations clause a nullity." OPM v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 428 (1990).
16. Heckler, 467 U.S. at 65.
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government and so entitle the claimant to monetary payment not otherwise permitted by law. 7
Richmond was given unauthorized and erroneous advice from a federal employee regarding a disability annuity. Relying on the incorrect
information, Richmond exceeded the statutory limit on earnings and lost
six months worth of benefits. Claiming estoppel against the government,
he sought benefits notwithstanding the plain language of the statutory
limit. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"8 focused on Heckler's decision not to adopt a flat rule against governmental estoppel, 19
and found the facts to be sufficiently extreme to apply estoppel. 20 Overturning the decision, the Supreme Court seemed to regard the appellate
court's decision as an indicator of the need for stronger direction:
[Courts of appeals have taken our statements as an invitation to
search for an appropriate case in which to apply estoppel against the
government.... The extraordinary number of [summary reversals by
the Supreme Court] ... provides a good indication that our approach
to these [estoppel] cases has provided inadequate guidance for the federal courts .... 2 1
Although the Richmond Court again refused to embrace a flat prohibitory rule, it referred with approval to the "clarity of earlier decisions" such as FederalCrop.2 2 But the Court did hold that estoppel does
preclude any monetary claims against the government. 23 Two crucial
reasons were given: first, to prevent fraud, corruption, and collusion;24
and second, to assure that public funds are spent in accordance with congressional intent for the common good, rather than for individual
complaints.25
Noting that no High Court case has ever sustained a claim of governmental estoppel for the payment of money, the Court referenced the
need 26 and historical motivation2 7 for a check upon any potential avenue
of corruption regarding public revenues. In short, the conservative rule
17. 496 U.S. 414 (1990).
18. Richmond v. OPM, 862 F.2d 294 (Fed. Cir. 1988), rev'd, 496 U.S. 414 (1990).
19. Heckler, 467 U.S. at 51; see Richmond, 862 F.2d at 294 (indicating that "the Supreme
Court has clearly left open the possibility that estoppel may be invoked against government agencies
in some... circumstances. In [Heckler] the... Court specifically declined an invitation to announce a flat rule against governmental estoppel."). Id. at 296-97.
20. Richmond, 496 U.S. at 419.
21. Id. at 422-23.
22. Id. at 421.
23. Id. at 427, 434.
24. Id. at 426-27.
25. Id. at 428, 433.
26. I at 426; see Heckler v. Community Health Services, 467 U.S. 51, 63 (1984).
27. Richmond, 496 U.S. at 427.
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of Richmond is a rule against abuse and fumctions to protect the public
interest.2 8
B. A LiberalApproach
As alluded above, the liberal view of governmental estoppel can be
justified on the basis of the Supreme Court's refusal to unequivocally establish that the government may "never" be estopped. 29 A case exemplary of this more liberal approach is United States v. Lazy FC Ranch.30
In Lazy FC Ranch, a county official of the Agriculture Stabilization &
Conservation Service of the Department of Agriculture (ASCS) informed
the partners of the Lazy FC Ranch partnership that if they would subdivide the Ranch's land into smaller parcels, they could qualify for financial benefits under the maximum payment limitation of the government's
31
Soil Bank conservation program.
Additionally, the same government agent assisted the partners in
arranging separate leases. The partners then entered into contracts with
the federal government, with approval by the state ASCS office, to begin
participation in two Soil Bank programs in 1957. In 1958 the United
States closed one of the programs before the end of the contract term.
The Ranch subsequently attempted to terminate the other contracts, but
state ASCS officials denied the request. In 1961 the Ranch was sold in its
entirety, terminating the residual contracts.
A few months later, the State Committee of the ASCS ascertained
that the contracts were in violation of the prohibition against the use of
partnership leasing as a means to circumvent the maximum payment limitation. However, the regulations in effect at the creation of the contracts
did not expressly forbid such division of lands. Therefore, the regulations were amended in 1958, during the lease term, to clearly state that a
partnership shall be considered one producer. Despite finding no evidence of collusive intent, an administrative hearing denied permission for
the Ranch to keep the unauthorized payments as equitable relief. The
28. Various federal appellate circuits have shared the Supreme Court's conservative approach
to governmental estoppel. See, eg., EEOG v. Huber 927 F.2d 1322, 1331 (5th Cir. 1991); Triplett v.
Heckler, 767 F.2d 210, 213 (5th Cir. 1985); Walls v. Mississippi State Dept. of Public Welfare, 730
F.2d 306, 324 (5th Cir. 1984); Emery v. TMW, 744 F.2d. 1411 (10th Cir. 1984); Heiks v. Harris, 606
F.2d 65 (5th Cir. 1979). However, these circuits have not been entirely consistent. See, e.g., Penny
v. Guiffrida, 897 F.2d 1543 (10th Cir. 1990) (involving affirmative misconduct); Duthu v. Sullivan,
886 F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1989) (involving affirmative misconduct).
29. See Johnson v. Williford, 682 F.2d 868 (9th Cir. 1982) (indicating that equitable estoppel is
not available as a defense, generally, especially where the government is acting pursuant to its sovereign capacity; however, estoppel may attach when equity demands).
30. 481 F.2d 985 (9th Cir. 1973).
31. However, all the funds were treated as partnership income. Id. at 986 n.l.
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United States then brought suit to recover the funds, and the Ranch
claimed an estoppel defense.
Choosing a fairness rationale, the appellate court applied estoppel.
Citing a line of Ninth Circuit cases which allow an estoppel defense
against the government, even in its sovereign role, the Lazy FC Ranch
court stated that two requirements must be met: First, the Government's
wrongful conduct must threaten to work a serious injustice, and second,
the public's interest must not be unduly damaged by the imposition of
estoppel.32
Significantly, the court did not consider the unauthorized payments
of public funds to be significantly contrary to public policy in this context. The liberal rule expressed in Lazy FCRanch, then, is applied by the
Ninth Circuit only in circumstances where the public interest is not
threatened.3 3
C.

The LouisianaApproach

Because Louisiana is an important petroleum-producing state, and
because there are Louisiana statutes, discussed later, that bear directly on
the government's ability and duty to collect mineral royalties, it is worthwhile understanding Louisiana's approach to estoppel of state government. In Louisiana the government can be estopped in the same manner
as any individual.3 4 Everyone, including the government, is "at liberty to
renounce what the law has established in its favour,, 35 because governmental estoppel is not expressly or impliedly prohibited by law. 3 6 However, estoppel of the government, or indeed of any party, is not permitted
37
if its effects are contrary to the public interest.
The sources of the state's public policy are its constitution, laws, and
state supreme court holdings. 31 Most importantly for this general discussion, parties are not ever bound by any agreement which is in violation of
32. Id. at 989.

33. See Kathleen L. Nutt, Estopping the State: Justand EquitableConsiderations,34 DRAKE L.
REv.197, 216 (1984-85).
34. State ex rel. Shell Oil Co. v. Register of State Land Office, 192 So. 519, 520 (La. 1939)

(stating it is well-settled that the doctrine of estoppel applies to the State just as it does to individuals); see also State v. Texas Co., 30 So. 2d 107, 112 (La. 1947) (estopping the State from asserting
that certain land was not included in a lease); J.D. Adams Co. v. Jackson Parish, 5 So. 2d 892 (La.
1942) (estopping governmental body from denying a contract after its terms were fulfilled); Rodgers
v. First Sewerage Dist., 171 So. 2d 820 (La. Ct. App. 1965) (estopping government agency for an

irregular exercise of a granted power).
35. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 11 (1870 & West 1972) (revised by LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 7
(1987 & West 1993)).
36. Id. (indicating that the law allows that which it does not forbid).
37. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 7 (1993).
38. Id.; see also Slayton v. Newton, 299 F. 279, 280 (5th Cir. 1924).
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a prohibitory law.39 "Whatever is done in violation of a prohibitory law
is void."' Estoppel may never be invoked to impair the effect of a prohibitory law,4 1 also known as a mandatory law. 42
Any law enacted for the protection of the public interest4 3 qualifies
as a "prohibitory law."' Laws regulating the public fisc are subject to
great protection. 45 The term "mandatory law" is defined by statute as
any legislative prescription that uses the word "shall." LouisianaRevised
StatutesAnnotated article 1:3 states, "The word 'shall' is mandatory and
the word 'may' is permissive."
Thus, Louisiana law creates a paradox. The state can be estopped
like any individual except where "mandatory," or "prohibitory" laws are
concerned.
IV.

A JURISDICTIONAL ANALYSIS OF WHETHER THE GOVERNMENT
CAN

A.

BE

ESTOPPED FROM COLLECTING MINERAL ROYALTIES

FederalAuthorities

Several federal courts, appellate and district, have considered the
issue of whether federal agencies can be estopped to collect mineral royalties. In every case, the equitable defense has been rejected. The principles of Federal Crop seem to hold particular sway on public lands.
The federal government has authority to lease vast tracts of public
lands for mineral exploration and development. These lands are located
both on and offshore. The federal authorities are authorized to lease onshore by virtue of the Minerals Lands Leasing Act (MLLA) 6 and, offshore, under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments
(OCSLAA). 7 The MLLA specifically authorizes the Secretary of the
Interior to reduce consideration exigible from certain federal mineral
leases when, in his judgment, such a reduction would promote
development.4 8
39. Oil Field Supply & Scrap Material Co. v. Grifford Hill Co., 16 So. 2d 77, 78 (La. Ct. App.
1942).
40. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 12 (West 1992); see also Cilluffa v. Monreale Realty Co., 24 So.
2d 606, 609 (La. 1946) (quoting Rhodes v. Miller, 179 So. 430, 432 (La. 1938)).
41. Cilluffa, 24 So. 2d at 609 (quoting Rhodes, 179 So. at 432). "Where a statute makes no
exceptions the Supreme Court cannot do so." Owles v. Jackson, 7 So. 2d 192 (La. 1942).
42. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 7 (West 1993).
43. See American Waste & Pollution Control v. Louisiana, 588 So. 2d 367, 372-73 (La. 1991).
44. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 7 cmt. (West Supp. 1993) (defining prohibitory law).
45. State Bond Comm'n v. All Taxpayers, 525 So. 2d 521 (La. 1988) (illustrating Louisiana's
position that there may be no withdrawal from the public treasury without a specific appropriation).
46. 30 U.S.C. §§ 181-287 (1986 & Supp. 1992).
47. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1356 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990).
48. 30 U.S.C. § 209.
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The leading case on estoppel of the federal government to collect
mineral royalty is Atlantic Richfield Company v. Hickel.4 9 In Atlantic
Richfield the plaintiff oil company obtained two "non-competitive" oil
and gas leases on January 1, 1940. Both leases contained a "step scale"
royalty clause, under which royalty increased from 12-1/2 to 32%, as
production rose. In 1946 the MLLA was amended to make the 32%
royalty rate ineffective in certain cases. The new exceptions were created
to encourage further oil and gas exploration. Atlantic Richfield, however, discovered new oil and gas within the horizontal limits of a previously known oil and gas deposit. These deeper zones had been
discovered by drilling outside the lease acreage. Subsequent judicial proceedings determined that Atlantic Richfield had not, in terms of law, met
the statutory requirements for a reduction in royalty, by virtue of producing this type of oil.
The two formations at issue, the Madison and the Cambrian, were
discovered in 1948. That same year, the Regional Director of the USGS,
pursuant to a request by Atlantic Richfield, purported to determine that
the relevant lands were "outside and not within the productive limits of
any producing oil or gas deposit lying below the base of Tensleep formation, as such productive limits were known to exist on August 8, 1946, as
authorized by Section 12 of the Act of Congress approved August 8,
1946. ' Under the terms of the amendments, the natural implication of
this finding was that oil produced from the Madison and Cambrian formations were royalty based on 12-1/2%. A USGS supervisor even signed
a division order to that effect.
Thirteen years later, the regional supervisor of the USGS advised
Atlantic Richfield that "back royalties due according to the [32%] stepscale provision were being demanded from April 1, 1948 to September
30, 1961, as to production from the Madison and Cambrian formations.""1 Atlantic Richfield filed administrative appeals, all of which
were lost. It then filed for relief in district court and lost there, too. The
Tenth Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court.
First, the Tenth Circuit determined that the oil and gas deposits in
the Madison and Cambrian formations were indeed not covered by any
of the exceptions enumerated in the 1946 Amendment.5 2 However, Atlantic Richfield argued that under the circumstances, the government
49.
50.
51.
52.

432 F.2d 587 (10th Cir. 1970).
Id. at 589.
Id.
Id. at 590-91.
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was estopped from collecting the extra royalties. The court decisively
rejected this argument by holding that an "administrative determination
running contrary to law will not constitute an estoppel against the federal
government." 3 Atlantic Richfield further asserted that the government
should be estopped for its agents' actions within the scope of their employment. The court, however, held that the Secretary was without authority to accept less than the step-scale provision of the lease. The fact
that the government agents had accepted a lesser royalty for thirteen
years was not a justification for altering the obligation of the Secretary
nor for estopping the government."4 Relying on Federal Crop, the Atlantic Richfield court expressed its duty to "observe the conditions defined by
Congress for charging the public treasury." 5 5
The Atlantic Richfield court's holding on estoppel may be summarized as follows: One, an agent of the government never acts within the
scope of his authority when he purports to release payments of mineral
royalty otherwise due to the government; two, the mineral lessee is, like
all other citizens, deemed to know the law and may not take advantage of
the mistake or fraud of the agent of the government; and finally, the issue
of mineral royalty estoppel is peculiarly sensitive because such a defense,
if successful, would directly prejudice the public fisc. These reasonings
have been repeated time and again in subsequent jurisprudence dealing
with estoppel of the government to collect mineral royalties.
The Tenth Circuit recently used the Atlantic Richfield rule to decide
a case involving royalty estoppel. In JicarillaApache Tribe v. Supron
Energy Corporation,5 6 the Secretary of the Interior was found negligent
for failing to protect the tribe's interest in a mineral lease by not requiring "dual accounting" of the oil and gas lessee. As a result, the tribe
was underpaid on royalties. The lessee argued that the government, because of equitable considerations, should be held liable for any additional
royalties assessed. The Tenth Circuit disagreed, stating that the Secretary's breach of a fiduciary duty to enforce the leases did not excuse the
lessees from obeying the lease terms and pay the royalty amounts owed.5 8
53. Id. at 591.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 591-92 (citing Federal Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380, 385 (1947) (emphasis
added)).
56. 793 F.2d 1171 (10th Cir. 1986) (en bane).
57. Id. at 1172.
58. Id.; see Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Hickel, 432 F.2d 587, 592 (10th Cir. 1970); see also Trapper Mining, Inc. v. Lujan, 923 F.2d 774, 781 (10th Cir. 1991) (indicating DOI would not be estopped
from readjusting term of hard mineral lease, when such power was granted by statute, even though
DOI official had earlier represented that readjustment would not take place for another ten years,
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Another federal appellate case, which does not directly involve royalties, but articulates useful principles, is Union Oil Company of California v. Morton.5 9 In Union Oil four oil companies (Union Oil) obtained a
very lucrative federal oil and gas lease in the Santa Barbara Channel off
the coast of California. The lease, which cost $61 million, was granted
by the Secretary of the Interior under the legislative predecessor of the
OCSLAA. e The lease gave Union Oil broad development rights, including the right to erect and station drilling platforms, subject to the provisions of the OCSLAA and "reasonable regulations. '6 1 Union Oil
proceeded to erect two major platforms, A and B. In September 1968,
Union Oil sought and obtained permission to erect a third platform, C.
In January 1969, as platform C was being installed, a massive blowout
occurred on one of platform A's wells. Thus ensued the notorious Santa
Barbara oil spill.6 2
Shortly thereafter, the Secretary suspended all activities on the lease
while environmental studies were carried out. On the completion of
these studies in late 1971, the Secretary announced that Union Oil would
be prohibited from erecting platform C because of possible environmental risks. Additionally, he ordered that all activity on platforms A and B
be suspended pending legislative cancellation of the lease. Union Oil
filed suit.
On appeal, the issue was whether the order denying permission for
Union Oil to install platform C was valid. The Union Oil lease granted
the lessee "the right to construct or direct [drilling platforms]." The Secretary, however, was granted broad conservation powers over offshore
natural resources by virtue of the OCSLAA. 63 An earlier Ninth Circuit
decision in the same controversy, Gulf Oil Corporation v. Morton, had
held that the words "conservation of the natural resources" were wide
enough to cover broad environmental, and not just narrow mineral, concerns." Therefore, the Gulf Oil court had held that the Secretary had
been empowered, prior to the issuance of the 1968 lease, to protect the
environment of the OCS.
and lessee had relied thereon); Enfield v. Kleppe, 566 F.2d 1139, 1142-43 (10th Cir. 1977) (holding
that oil and gas lessee's reliance on invalid regulation was irrelevant).
59. 512 F.2d 743 (9th Cir. 1975).
60. The particular lease in Union Oil was granted pursuant to the Outer Continental Shelf
Lands Act, which predated the 1978 Amendments.
61. Union Oil, 512 F.2d at 746.
62. Id.
63. 43 U.S.C. § 1334(a)(1) (1986); Union Oil, 512 F.2d at 748-49 (indicating that the Secretary
shall pass regulations providing for the conservation of Outer Continental Shelf natural resources).
64. 493 F.2d 141 (9th Cir. 1973).
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Union Oil argued that the subsequent regulation, under whose authority the Secretary had canceled Union Oil's "right" to erect Platform
C, was invalid as being contrary to the express language of the lease. The
Ninth Circuit rejected this argument, stating that the "terms inconsistent
with the lease are invalid." Citing Federal Crop, the court made clear
that Congress retained the power to amend existing rules for the protection of the public interest in conserving natural resources. 65
Union Oil also argued that its reliance on the terms of the lease
should estop the DOI "from enforcing statutory provisions contrary to
the lease." 6 6 In the Ninth Circuit, the government generally can be estopped, even in its sovereign capacity, on an "affirmative misconduct"
standard.6 7 Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit held in Union Oil:
We are very reluctant to apply estoppel against the [g]ovenment in
cases involving rights to public land. Furthermore, in this case, the
costs to the public could be enormous if the Secretary were estopped to
maintain continuing, vigorous regulation of Union's drilling, including
suspension of its operations and of its installation of new platforms
when appropriate. The costs to Union would be merely the loss of
anticipated profits if its leases were canceled, or postponement of those
profits if its operations were suspended. The equitable considerations
which underlie application of estoppel dictate that the doctrine should
not be applied in the circumstances of this case. 68
Although Union Oil did not concern estoppel of the government to
collect mineral royalties, the case does reflect some important principles.
First, the court emphasized, even in the context of the liberal Ninth Circuit, how unwilling a federal court should be to apply estoppel against
the government in cases involving federal natural resources.6 9 Secondly,
the court discounted the significance of the lessee's anticipated profits.7 0
This latter point is all the more significant in that, within the circumstances of Union Oil, the lessee did genuinely anticipate making profits
from the uninterrupted operation of its mineral leasehold rights. In the
case of royalty estoppel, the lessee may never legitimately anticipate
greater profits accruing from the underpayment of royalty.
The Department of the Interior (DOI) determined in the early
1980's that the collection of oil and gas royalties from federal onshore
65. Union Oil, 512 F.2d at 748-49.
66. Id. at 748 n.2.

67.
68.
69.
70.

See, e.g., United States v. Lazy FC Ranch, 481 F.2d 985, 989 (9th Cir. 1973).
Union Oil, 512 F.2d at 748-49 n.2.
Id. at 748 n.2.
Id. at 749 n.2.
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lands was "archaic and inadequate. ' 7 1 Accordingly, the Federal Oil &
Gas Royalty Act (FOGRA) was enacted with a view for rectifying the
situation. 72 Among other things, the new statute directed the Secretary
of the Interior to "establish a comprehensive inspection, collection and
physical and production accounting and auditing system to provide the
capacity to accurately determine oil and gas royalties, interest, fines, penalties, fees, deposits, and other payments owed, and to collect and account for such amounts in a timely manner. ' 73 The response of the
Secretary was to grant principal responsibility for onshore royalty collection to the Minerals Management Service (MMS). Formerly, the United
States Geological Survey (USGS) possessed this responsibility. Additionally, new regulations were enacted relative to the definition of market
value for mineral royalty purposes. In particular, it was provided:
The value of production, for the purpose of computing royalty, shall be
the estimated reasonable value of the product as determined by the
Under no circumAssociate Director [of the regional MMS] ....
stances shall the value of production of any of the said substances for
the purposes of computing royalty be deemed to be less than the gross
proceeds accruing to the lesee .... 74
In this regulatory context, a dispute arose between Marathon Oil
Company and the United States regarding royalty payments on certain
federal leases in Alaska.75 In 1959 Marathon had discovered natural gas
in the Kenai Field. Production began in 1961. The federal leases pro76
vided for a one eighth royalty "on the reasonable value of production.
In 1977 the USGA tackled Marathon on the issue of royalty on natural
gas liquids. Marathon had been selling the liquids to customers in Japan,
but had been computing the royalty on the basis paid for fuel gas under a
long-term contract with Alaska Pipeline Company. The USGS insisted
that royalty should have been paid on the sales price received from the
Japanese customers, less certain deductions.
In an effort to resolve the dispute, Marathon and the USGS entered
into a settlement agreement in 1981, providing that royalties were to be
computed on "thirty-six percent of the per MMbtu price receipt in Japan
for the LNG (less certain adjustments)." 7 7 This compromise agreement
71. Federal Oil and Gas Royalty Management Act of 1982, 30 U.S.C. §§ 2(a)(2), 1701(a)(2)

(1982).
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

30 U.S.C. § 1701.
30 U.S.C.A. § 1711(a).
30 C.F.R. § 206.103 (1979).
Marathon Oil Co. v. United States, 604 F. Supp. 1375 (D. Alaska 1984).
Id. at 1375.
Id. at 1377.
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further provided that the settlement would be effective "until such time
as changes in market conditions, State or Federal law, or regulations
adopted thereunder . . . necessitate a revision in the methods used to
'78
determine the wellhead value."
By early 1983, when the MMS entered the scene, it notified Marathon that royalty values would have to be redetermined. The MMS
wanted to change the formula to allow for altered "costs and prices due
to economic conditions." 7 9 The MMS's formula would have involved
valuing the gas delivered to the LNG plant at $3.00 pair MCF. By contrast, under the settlement agreement, Marathon had been valuing such
gas at $1.71 per MCF. The MMS, getting no cooperation from Marathon, entered a series of orders directing Marathon to pay royalty as requested. Marathon filed suit for relief in federal court.
Marathon argued both constitutional and contractual positions.
However, the court recognized that the federal oil lease statutes and regulations gave the MMS the authority to compute royalties by determining the reasonable value of gas production. Consequently, it concluded
that the settlement agreement could not restrict the proper exercise of the
agency's statutory authority. 0
From 1976 to 1981, the General Accounting Office issued a series of
reports regarding management and collection problems in federal oil and
gas royalties. In October of 1981, one such report declared that many
financial management problems that existed twenty years ago still persisted. The report also speculated that the government's failure to place
higher priorities on oil and gas royalties resulted in a yearly loss of millions of dollars in uncollected royalty income and an increase in interest
costs.
The Secretary of the Interior established the Linowes Commission 8 '
in order to investigate this problem. The Commission's report, issued in
January of 1982, stated that the government's royalty record-keeping for
Federal and Indian oil and gas leases was in such disarray that the exact
amount of underpayment was unknown. It estimated that because of the
government's poor management, hundreds of millions of dollars due to
the United States Treasury, the States, and Indian tribes were going uncollected each year. The Commission concluded that the government's
entire royalty management system needed a "thorough overhaul" and
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 1378-79.
81. Formally referred to as the Commission on Fiscal Accountability of the Nation's Energy
Resources.
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provided a list of sixty recommendations for doing so. 8 2
Relying on the 1981 Settlement Agreement, and on an internal
USGS memo (Duletsky Memorandum) which observed that it was "impractical" to apply the net back method evaluation (which took the Japanese liquid sales into account) to the Marathon LNG situation,
Marathon argued estoppel.8" The court rejected this plea, constantly
noting the mandatory language of FOGRA and its subsidiary administrative regulations. The court noted that the doctrine of equitable estoppel applied to the government only in unusual circumstances, and that it
was reluctant to estop the government in cases which involved the rights
to public lands. It stated that "[e]stoppel will be applied only if the government's wrongful conduct threatens to work a serious injustice and if
the public's interest would not be unduly damaged." 84
The district court's decision was affirmed by the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals." The Marathon Oil case is important because the
court found that even using the liberal Ninth Circuit definition of governmental estoppel, which allows for estoppel in cases of affirmative misconduct, there was no injustice in this mineral law case, and that equitable
considerations would not be allowed to override the authority vested in
the Department of the Interior and the MMS. Importantly, the court
equated loss of royalties to prejudice to the "public treasury." 8 6 Neither
did the court attribute much weight to Marathon's alleged loss of profits.
A subsequent case, involving an implicit estoppel argument, was
Pennzoil Exploration & Production Company v. Lujan. 7 Pennzoil, unlike
Marathon, was a lessee on federal offshore lands leased under the authority of the OCSLAA. That statute provides that royalties are to be paid
on "the amount or value of the production saved, removed or sold."8 8
The Secretary of the Interior is given authority to prescribe rules and
regulations in order to administer the royalty provision.8 9 In 1979, the
Secretary issued a regulation that provided:
The value of production shall never be less than the fair market value
under no circumstances shall the value of production be less than
the gross proceeds accruing to the lessee from the disposition of the
82. Marathon Oil, 604 F. Supp. at 1380-81.
83. Id. (indicating that Marathon did not place great reliance on the USGS's long period of
acquiescence from 1959 to 1977).
84. Marathon Oil, 604 F. Supp. at 1384.
85. Marathon Oil Co. v. United States, 807 F.2d 759 (9th Cir. 1986).
86. Marathon Oil, 604 F. Supp. at 1384.
87. 751 F. Supp. 602 (E.D. La. 1990).
88. 43 U.S.C.A. § 1334(a) (West 1986).
89. Id.
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produced substances or less than the value computed on the reasonable
unit value established by the Secretary. 90
From August 1980 through January 1981, Pennzoil sold oil under
an OCS lease pursuant to a scheme known as the Tertiary Incentive Program. This program had as its objective the encouragement of production from depleted oil resources. The recovered oil was permitted to be
sold at free market values. Otherwise, oil prices were still generally subject to regulation. While Pennzoil sold the oil at the free market rate, it
paid royalties only on the rate it would have received for the oil had it
not participated in the Tertiary Oil Program.
Not surprisingly, the MMS objected and ordered Pennzoil to pay
royalties on the correct legal basis, which, in this case, was gross proceeds. Pennzoil's defense was that it should be allowed to pay a royalty
on the regulated price because it was using some of the receipts from the
sale of the oil to pay for the expensive technology required to produce
tertiary oil. Judge Schwartz dismissed this defense summarily: "[I]t is
superfluous that Pennzoil may have used some of its receipts to pay for
tertiary recovery projects since there is no authority to allow the DOI to
assess royalties on a lower basis than the gross proceeds." 9 1
Pennzoil also tried to argue that the Department of Energy Tertiary
Oil Incentive Program "should implicitly overrule the DOI regulation."9 2 Judge Schwartz again rejected the argument, holding that
Pennzoil's position was based on general policy considerations which
were not compelling enough to overrule the Secretary of the Interior's
statutory authority to regulate the basis for assessing royalties.9 3
Although the Pennzoil case did not explicitly involve an estoppel
argument, the case is pertinent because Pennzoil made the sort of "prodevelopment" argument often asserted by producers. Namely, Pennzoil
argued that it was economically wise for it to be allowed to a royalty on
less than market value. The Eastern District of Louisiana rejected this
notion on the simple basis that whatever general economic considerations
might dictate, the DOI had no authority to charge less royalty than that
required by regulation.
B.

Texas
In Texas the situation is made complex due to the fact that several
90.
91.
92.
93.

30 C.F.R. 206.150 (1979).
Pennzoil Exploration & Prod. Co. v. Lujan, 751 F. Supp. 602, 605 (E.D. La. 1990).
Id. at 606.
Id.
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mineral agencies have authority to regulate oil and gas operations on
various types of state lands. 94 However, the Texas mineral leasing statutes generally impose strict requirements regarding length of primary
term and minimum royalties. 95 On the one occasion that it has been
raised, the defense of estoppel of the government to collect royalties was
rejected. 96 Texas courts, like their federal counterparts, have accorded
great importance to the state's interest in its natural resources.
For example, the Texas Supreme Court strongly expressed this sentiment in Grayburg Oil Company v. Jiles, in which an oil and gas lessee
obtained a mineral lease on a river bottom. 97 At the time of the issuance
of the lease, it was required that a $2.00 per acre fee be paid throughout
the ten years of the primary term. However, a subsequent statute provided that the $2.00 per acre per annum fee could be discontinued if five
wells had been drilled in the lease premises and $100,000.00 had been
spent. The new statute, however, only applied to "leases of bays, marshes, reefs, salt water lakes or other submerged lands." Therefore, the
principal issue was whether a river bottom was a "submerged land." The
Texas Supreme Court adopted a narrow interpretation of "submerged
land" and held that a riverbottom did not fit within the category. The
court held that as a matter of long held policy, "river beds and channels
of navigable streams should be held by the State in trust for the whole
people" and that explicit language is the only acceptable means of authorizing a sale to lease. The court used two additional factors in construing the narrow interpretation: first, any statutes relating to the sale
or lease of such land should be strictly construed in favor of the state;
and second, the public policy rationale that any ambiguity must be construed in favor of the state. 9 8
There is only one instance where a Texas oil and gas lessee has tried
to argue that the state is estopped to collect royalty. In Grayburg Oil
Company v. State9 9 the General Land Office leased a portion of the Pecos
riverbed for oil and gas operations. The lease was dated January 13,
94. See, e.g., J.D. Adams, Jr., Oil and Gas Leasing Upon Texas State Lands, 47 TEX. B.J. 18
(1984) (noting that Texas owns or possesses an interest in over 22.5 million acres and that such lands
are administered by various agencies, many possessing separate and distinct oil and gas leasing
requirements).
95. See, eg., Tax. NAT. REs. CODE ANN. §§ 52.021-022 (Vernon Supp. 1991) (indicating that
the primary term "shall be" for period not to exceed five years, and royalties "shall" be based on "1/
8 of gross production of gas produced and sold in the area."). Id. The statutes apply to certain
defined land and pertain to the authority of the School Land Board, Id.
96. Grayburg Oil Co. v. State, 50 S.W.2d 355 (Tex. Ct. App. Austin 1932).
97. 186 S.W.2d 680 (Tex. 1945).
98. Id. at 682.
99. 50 S.W.2d 355 (rex. Ct. App. Austin 1932).
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1927. Through a process of assignment, Grayburg Oil obtained an executive interest in the lease. Interestingly, the oil was extracted by digging
trenches in the riverbed, into which oil then seeped. Not surprisingly,
this unusual operation caused significant environmental problems.
The Game, Fish, and Oyster Commission and the Texas Railroad
Commission proceeded to treat the escaping oil as waste. Both agencies
knew of and acquiesced in the attempts of an earlier assignee of the oil
and gas lease to gather the oil and sell it as his own. But neither the
Game, Fish, and Oyster Commission nor the Texas Railroad Commission possessed any authority to collect royalties in this situation.
Grayburg Oil, the subsequent assignee, argued that such state inaction
served to estop the General Land Commission from collecting royalties
on oil so gathered.
The Texas Court of Civil Appeals rejected this estoppel defense.
The court reasoned that the departments involved had no authority to
determine, waive, or collect royalties. Several statutes explicitly delineated the royalty amounts and terms to be contained in state leases. Even
with actual knowledge of the facts, the land Commissioner had no authority to suggest that the state had no right to royalties. Such a statement would be a mistake of law or an ultra vires act. Therefore, the state
would not be estopped. 1 °
The facts in GrayburgOil were certainly unusual in that the agencies
alleged to have created the estoppel lacked any positive authority whatsoever to collect royalties. Nonetheless, the court's characterization of
the acts giving rise to the alleged estoppel as being either a mistake at law
or an ultra vires act aptly reasoned away the lessee's estoppel arguments.
C. Louisiana
The viability of the defense of estoppel of the government to collect
royalty has not been resolved in a Louisiana court. However, the legal
position in Louisiana is clearly delineated by statute. LouisianaRevised
Statutes Annotated sections 30:129A and 136A serve to defeat any possible defense of estoppel of the government to collect royalties, because
these statutes are "prohibitory laws."
The Louisiana State Mineral Board was created to be the "central
agency for leasing state lands."' 01 The general supervisory authority of
100. Id. at 357-58 (citing Carothers v. Rogan, 96 Tex. 113 (1902)); see also Jeems Bayou Fishing
& Hunting Club v. United States, 260 U.S. 561 (1922).
101. William 0. Bonin, Comment, Public Mineral Leasing in Louisiana, 27 TUL.L. REv. 246,
247 (1953).
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the Mineral Board is set forth in Louisiana Revised Statutes Annotated
section 30:129A, which states:
Powers, Duties, and Authority of Board; Pulling Agreements; Operation Units.
A. The Board shall have full supervision of all mineral leases granted
by the state, in order that it may determine that the terms of these
leases are fully complied with, and it has general authority to take any
action for the protection of the interest of the state. The Board shall
take all appropriate action, including the recovery of nonproducing
leased acreage whenever possible, to assure that undeveloped or nonproducing state lands and water bottoms are reasonably and prudently
explored, developed, and produced for the public good. It may institute actions to annul a lease upon any legal ground. The Board has
authority to enter into agreements or to amend a lease. However, the
Board shall not extend the primary term of any lease. Furthermore,
the Board shall not, except as to unitization and pooling agreements,
amend a lease by reducing the amount of bonus, rental, royalty, or
other considerations stipulated in the lease. 10 2
This language gives the Mineral Board complete authority to determine that mineral leases are complying with lease terms and to take "any
action for the protection of the state." However, the Mineral Board is
expressly prohibited from "reducing the amount of bonus, rental, royalty
or other considerations stipulated in the lease." The word "amend" is
not a term of legal art in Louisiana. According to the Louisiana Civil
Code, such words are given their plain and ordinary meaning. 10 3 Clearly,
in this instance, the word "amend" extends to any kind of alteration of
the terms of a mineral lease, including any actions which might otherwise
be considered to amount to an estoppel. Louisiana Revised Statutes Annotated section 30:129A is clearly a "prohibitory law" as that term is
used in Louisiana. Obviously, the law is intended for the "preservation
of the public interest." Additionally, the statute uses, in pertinent part,
the word "shall," which is unequivocally "mandatory" in effect." °
Additionally, the Louisiana Legislature further clarified the Mineral
Board's authority by the following provision:
Funds, Disposition and Appropriation of, Penalties.
A. (1) All bonuses, rentals, royalties, shut-in payments or other
sums payable to the state as the lessor under the terms of valid existing
mineral leases entered into under this subpart or previously granted by
the state and under the supervision granted by the State and under the
102. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 30:129A (West 1992).
103. Id. § 1:3 (referencing "common and approved usage.").
104. Id.
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Board or from leases hereafter granted shall be paid to the Office of
Mineral Resources, and all such payments if made payable to the Registrar of the State Land Office as previously required, may be endorsed
and otherwise processed by the Secretary of the Department of Natural Resources pursuant to his general authority in regard to the functions of that office as provided in R.S. 36:921 through R.S. 36:926....
The failure or delay of the Board to take any action or perform any
function with respect to any payment shall not affect the validity of
any payment made or tendered. 10 5
This provision covers problems arising from the payment of bonuses,
rentals, and royalties. The last sentence preserves the Board's right to
pursue lessees for underpaid royalties, notwithstanding the fact that the
Board may have accepted earlier incorrect payments. And again, the
statute uses the word "shall." In sum, it is clear that the Mineral Board
may not be estopped to collect mineral royalties.
D.

Utah

Utah has supplied what is probably the best recent discussion of
government royalty collection estoppel. As in all the other jurisdictions
reviewed, the defense was rejected. The discussion of governmental royalty collection estoppel can be found in the case of Plateau Mining Company v. Utah Division of State Lands and Forestry.10 6 In that case, the
State of Utah leased certain school trust lands to four different mining
companies in the 1960's. A standard lease form was used on each occasion. The royalty clause was as follows:
The Lessee, in consideration of the granting of the rights and privileges
aforesaid hereby covenants and agrees as follows: SECOND: To pay
to Lessor quarterly, on or before the 15th day of the month succeeding
each quarter, royalty (a) at the rate of 15& per ton of 2000 lbs. of coal
produced from the leased premises and sold or otherwise disposed of,
or (b) at the rate prevailing, at the beginning of the quarter for which
payment is being made, for federal lessees of land of similar character
under coal leases issued by the United States at that time, whichever is
higher .... 17
The lessees operated the coal mines on the leasehold premises into
the mid 1980's. Royalty was paid at the rate of 15& per ton, except for
one of the lessees, Consolidation Coal Company, which paid at the rate
of 17.5&. Up until 1979, this did not cause a problem as the "federal rate
prevailing" was about 15& per well. In 1979, however, the Secretary of
105. Id.
106. 802 P.2d 720 (Utah 1990).
107. Id. at 723.
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the Interior, pursuant to the authority vested in him by virtue of the
Federal Coal Leasing Amendment Act, raised the federal rate to eight
percent of the value of the coal produced from federal coal mines.10 8 The
new eight percent figure represented a major increase. The Utah lessees,
however, continued paying royalty at the low rate of 15& and 17.5&,
even though the leases clearly required payment at the higher of the two
possible methods. 109
In the 1980's, Utah advised the lessees that their leases were in good
standing."1 In late 1984, however, Utah began a proper audit of its coal
leases, with an attendant analysis of prevailing federal rates.1 1 The result was that the State made demand "for delinquent royalties, interest
and penalties for the period April 1, 1979, to December 31, 1984.' '12
The Utah lessees requested and lost in hearings before the Board of State
Lands. They then filed suits alleging that the State's decisions were invalid. The Utah lessees won in district court on the grounds, inter alia,
that: "the State was estopped from collecting past royalties through a
retroactive audit."1 " 3 The Utah Supreme Court reversed.
1 14
The court first found that the royalty clause was unambiguous.
This was not a situation, the court held, where an ambiguous provision
could be interpreted by the subsequent conduct of the parties." 5 Similarly, the lessees had a plain contractual duty to ascertain the applicable
11 6
rate and pay it.
The court then proceeded to flatly reject the estoppel argument.
The rule in Utah is that the State may be estopped in its governmental
capability only in "unusual circumstances," where failure to do so
"would result in injustice, and there would be no substantial adverse effect on public policy."1 " 7 The court found at the outset that there was
"no injustice in requiring the plaintiff to pay royalties at the prevailing
federal rate when they knew that the lease required them to pay at the
"prevailing rate."'1 8 The court also noted that in this type of case, Utah
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
be paid
115.
116.
117.
1979)).
118.

43 C.F.R. § 3473.3-2(a)(3) (1979).
Plateau Mining Co., 802 P.2d at 724.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 725.
Id. (indicating that the lease provision clearly states that the higher of the two rates should
to the State).
Id. at 727.
Id. at 728.
Id. (citing Celebrity Club, Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control Comm'n, 602 P.2d 689, 694 (Utah
Id.
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was in the position of a trustor and could not simply give away trust
assets. 9 The court also held that in these circumstances, estoppel
would work to undermine constitutional provisions mandating that state
lands "shall be held in trust for the people, to be disposed of as may be
provided by law, for the respective purposes for which they have been...
granted."' 12 0 Lastly, the court noted that the State's long acquiescence in
the royalty payments could not amount to an estoppel because such a
holding would be inconsistent with the legislative intent granting the
State the right to audit lessee records in order to ensure lease
1 21
compliance.
The court also rejected the Utah lessee's waiver arguments, noting
jurisprudence from other states that held that acceptance of royalty underpayments did not serve to waive the rights of private lessors.1 22 Thus
the court reversed the awards of summary judgment made in favor of the
Utah lessees in the district court. Bearing in mind the test for governmental estoppel in Utah, however, the court remanded the issue of estoppel back to the district court. 123 The court did not wish to foreclose the
Utah lessees from having the opportunity of showing new facts which
might meet their high standard of proof.
V.

POLICY ARGUMENTS SUPPORTING THE No-ESTOPPEL RULE IN

THE REALM OF MINERAL ROYALTY

Whether the federal government may ever be subject to estoppel is
still an open question. 124 However, the writers argue that, as a matter of
policy, governments, whether federal or state, should not be estopped to
collect mineral royalties. In such circumstances, holdings of estoppel
would operate to defeat the public interest.
Clearly, the government has an initial interest in the mineral leasing
of its state lands. 121 Mineral royalties are often a vital source of government revenue. As shown above, protection of the public fisc is at the
heart of the policy disfavoring governmental estoppel. Therefore, the
policy issue raised by a defense of governmental estoppel to collect royalty is really the same issue as that raised in Heckler and Richmond.
119. Id. at 729.
120. Id. (citing UTAH CONsT. art. XX, § 1).

121. Id. at 730 (citing UTAH ADMIN. R. 632-5-4 (1990)).
122. Id. (citing Holmes v. Kewanee Oil Co., 133 Kan. 544, 664 (1983), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 953
(1985)).
123. Id.
124. OPM v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 423 (1990).
125. See Marathon Oil Co. v. United States, 604 F. Supp. 1375 (1985); see also Mary Gilliam
Zuchegno, How New Rules Affect Existing Oil and Gas Leases, 19 CoLo. LAW. 2073 (1990).
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Apart from serving to rob the public fisc, government royalty collection estoppel would undermine the lawfully determined method of resource allocation chosen by both federal and state governments. Almost
all mineral leases in the United States, federal or state, are awarded on
the basis of public tender. The integrity of the bidding system requires
that successful bidders abide rigorously to the original contract terms
agreed to by them in the face of competition. And it should be noted
that state royalty payors never acquire a legitimate interest in underpaying royalty.
It may well be, of course, that a government might work to reduce
royalty so as to spur mineral development.12 6 But no honest government
would ever wish to reduce royalty by way of a collection estoppel. If
royalties are to be reduced, this should be done in an open legal way after
there has been the opportunity for review and debate. On the other
hand, if the government could be estopped to collect royalty, there would
be an open invitation for fraud and collusion involving state officials.
It would also be particularly harsh to estop a government from collecting mineral royalty for operational reasons. States such as Texas,
Louisiana, and Alaska employ a relatively small number of officials to
police oil and gas operations on state lands. Producers and operators are
in a much stronger position, having full knowledge of their own extensive
operations and complex accounting systems. Such companies can, if
they so desire, do much to shield their internal workings from outside
review. In fact, a high degree of continuing technical and legal evaluation is often required for royalty payment compliance, especially regarding what operational expense deductions, if any, are allowable. In such
circumstances, the burden to make proper royalty payments should be
placed on the lessee, not the regulatory authority. Where legal ambiguities are alleged to exist, the company should be required to seek
clarification.
VI.

CONCLUSION

There is a considerable legal debate as to when, if ever, the federal or
state governments should be subject to the equitable defense of estoppel.
After Heckler and Richmond, it seems as if a conservative approach that
focuses on applying the law, discouraging fraud and corruption, and protecting the public fisc has gained ascendancy, at least in federal courts.
126. The federal government, for example, has just announced that it will exercise its legal powers to reduce royalties in Gulf of Mexico federal leases where the water is between 200-400 meters

deep. See Newsletter, OIL & GAs J., Feb. 25, 1993, at 2.
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However, in the relatively narrow area of governmental activity that
is the subject of this article, it is clear that courts and legislatures, federal
and state, have simply rejected estoppel. A conservative approach to
governmental estoppel is particularly justified in the areas of royalty collection and conservation. Public resources, the public fisc, and the public's health are at issue. A contrary policy would provide a strong
incentive for fraud and corruption.
Courts and legislatures have found these considerations paramount.
The result has been that estoppel of the government to collect mineral
royalty has proven to be a blind alley for those attempting to assert it.
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